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The geographical structure of
capitalism at the origin of cultural
protest against globalization as
expressed in contemporary politics
of identity
De geografische structuur van het kapitalisme aan de oorsprong van het
cultureel protest tegen mondialisering uitgedrukt in hedendaagse vormen van
identiteitspolitiek
Pieter Saey, Marleen Renders and Siegfried Thijs
1 Fundamental changes are taking place in the balance of power between political parties
or movements in a large number of countries. In nearly all cases, the nature of political
discourse  underlying  national  politics  has  changed  radically.  The  pressure  of  global
economic processes and the collapse of the communist system narrowed the range of
arguments around Left-Right issues and thereby created an ideological vacuum in which
(at first sight) new kinds of politics could develop: a personalized politics of style (in
several European countries) or shifting coalitions of interest groups without any clear
ideological thread (e.g. India) on the one hand, and a politics of identity on the other
hand (politics  of  religion,  language,  regional  nationalism,  ethnicity)  (Cable,  1999,  pp.
43-44; see also Amin, 2000; Doom et al., 2000). In order to explain this shift in the political
debate,  it  is  tempting to  shift  focus  from conflicts  of  interest  to  values  and culture
accordingly.  We wish to  resist  this  temptation.  In our  opinion,  the above-mentioned
fundamental  changes should be explained by the failure of  capitalism to bring about
universal prosperity. We argue that contemporary changes in the functions of national
politics originate from the way contemporary capitalism functions geographically. Just as
the development of capitalism has generated conflicting collective interests in the past,
so its present failure to secure decent standards of living for unskilled workers in the core
states of  Western Europe,  in addition to its  failure to secure opportunities for social
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mobility  for  the  middle  strata  in  the  (semi)peripheral  states,  generates  collective
interests that clash with existing positions of power. This is the core of our position in the
scientific debate, which will be clarified in the course of this article. 
2 The reference to the past implies that whenever politics of identity are pursued, they
should be analysed in the light of the way capitalism functions geographically, but the
article itself is limited to contemporary politics of identity. The reference to a distinction
between core states and (semi)peripheral states implies that we shall deal with only one
kind of  politics  of  identity,  viz.  where  identity  has  the  connotation  of  civilization.
Following Huntington (1996), we may define civilization as the largest entity, apart from
humankind itself,  with which an individual can identify him/herself,  but we are fully
aware that it is a discursive category rather than a real entity: 
3 A civilization refers to a contemporary claim about the past in terms of its use in the
present to justify heritage, separateness, rights. Chinese civilization, Western civilization,
Indian civilization are such contemporary claims. These claims do not have to be based
exclusively  on  verifiable  empirical  data.  These  claims  are  in  any  case  based  on
contemporary choices about historical boundaries of inclusion. ... The reasons for such
claims cannot be located in what happened in the past but in what is happening in the
present (Wallerstein, 1991, pp. 235-236). 
4 The use of the terms “core state” and “(semi)peripheral state” indicates that we shall rely
on  Wallerstein’s  world-systems  analysis  to  define  the  geographical  structure  of
capitalism. The reason for choosing this approach will be explained in the first section.
5 We shall justify our position by analysing three cases of politics of identity that have the
connotation of civilization: Islamism (Muslim civilization), Hindu nationalism (Hinduism)
and  extreme  right-wing  nationalism  in  Europe  (Western  civilization).  Islamism  is  a
political  movement  that  seeks  to  confirm  the  relevance  of  the  Islamic  faith,  albeit
according to a selective and arbitrary interpretation,  to political  and social  issues.  It
comprises antimodernist factions as well as factions trying to islamitize modernity, and
has gathered enormous momentum in North Africa and the Middle East (Renders, 1999).
Hindu nationalism and extreme right-wing nationalism in Europe are forms of ethnic
nationalism1. We shall study them by means of the analysis of two paradigmatic parties,
the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party) and the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc). The
Bharatiya  Janata  Party is  a  nationalist  party,  rallying  Hindu  discontent  with  the
government’s enthusiasm for market disciplines and at the same time finding support for
its anti-Muslim populism (Banks and Muller,  1998,  p.  415).  “It  seeks to overcome the
heterogeneity and caste divisiveness of Indian society by consolidating a sense of Hindu
nationalism around symbols common to all who claim to be Hindus” (Brass, 1995, p. 89)
and has acceded to power via elections. The Vlaams Blok is an extreme right-wing populist
party,  capitalizing on an upsurge in anti(Muslim)-immigrant sentiment.  Its increasing
electoral success is illustrated by the fact that it has won the plurality in Antwerp, the
largest city of Flanders. As regards Islamism, no paradigmatic party can be singled out
because of the widely divergent situations in the states where the movement is active.
Therefore, we will deal with Islamism in general. The discussion of the three cases is the
subject of the second section (extreme right-wing nationalism in Europe/Vlaams Blok) and
of the third section (Hindu nationalism/Bharatiya Janata Party and Islamism). In the fourth
section, we combine the results of the discussion of the three cases and link them to the
geographical structure of capitalism as defined in the first section. 
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6 The object of the article is to give an answer to the question of how the geographical
structure of capitalism can be said to be at the origin of the rise of a particular kind of
political movement/party. Two propositions are integral to this answer: (i) an approach
starting  from  conflicts  of  interests  (generated  by  the  geographical  functioning  of
capitalism) leads to different conclusions about the rise of new parties from an approach
starting from values  and culture,  even when both approaches  rely  on the  theory of
cleavages  to  explain  the  general  structure  of  systems  of  political  parties;  (ii)  the
widespread  interpretation  of  (seemingly)  anti-secular  politics  of  identity  as  being
retrograde  phenomena  is  disputable,  even  when this  interpretation  derives  from an
approach starting from conflicts of interests generated by the unequal development of
capitalism.  The  analysis  of  the  Vlaams  blok focuses  on the  first  proposition,  and the
analysis of the Bharatiya Janata Party and Islamism on the second.
7 To sum up, the purpose of the article is to find a causal connection between cultural
protest against contemporary globalization in certain forms of politics of identity, and
unequal economic development on a global scale. It rejects explanations of this political
protest in terms of values and culture and in terms of traditional historical materialism. 
 
The geographical structure of capitalism 
8 World-systems analysis  starts  from the  premiss  that  the  division of  labour  refers  to
processes within an already constituted social arena (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977, p.
114). When local and regional economies are orientated towards production for a market
on a supra-regional scale and specialize serving this market, they are constituent parts of
a world-economy, whose spatial scope is coextensive with the division of labour among
them. This world-economy is  the arena in which social  action takes place and social
change occurs: 
9 [T]o understand the internal class contradictions and political struggles of a particular
state, we must first situate it in the world-economy. We can then understand the ways in
which various political and cultural thrusts may be efforts to alter or preserve a position
in the world-economy which is to the advantage or disadvantage of particular groups
within a particular state (Wallerstein, 1975, p. 16). 
10 To situate a state in the world-economy amounts to positioning it in the ever-present
division  of  cores,  peripheries  and semiperipheries,  united  and  reproduced  through
processes of capital accumulation and unequal exchange. Such an approach matches the
meaning  of  geographical  structure  or  geographical  functioning  of  capitalism in  this
article, viz. the way in which capitalism generates spatial inequalities on the scale of the
discursive category of civilization. 
11 The capitalist world-economy (or modern world-system) does not first exist and then
develop. Its development is its existence. This development entails the transformation of
land, labour and natural resources from phenomena utilized and distributed according to
social  conventions of  limited flexibility into commodities available for purchase on a
market. Consequently, the world-economy-historical or actually existing capitalism-is not
defined by alienable land or wage labour, but by the structural pressures to alienate more
land and to proletarize more labour.  This  implies  that  “at  all  points  of  its  historical
existence, the combination of allodial and non-allodial forms of tenure, of ”free“ and
”coerced“ (or ”non-free“) direct producers has been central to the functioning of the
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system”  (Hopkins  and  Wallerstein,  1977,  p.  126).  Free  farmers  and  wage  labour  are
concentrated in what become core areas; coerced labour and other forms of cheap labour
(semi-proletarized labour, unorganized wage labour) are concentrated in what become
peripheral areas. 
12 Capital constantly tries to tap cheap labour reserves in view of the high profits that keep
accumulation going. In the core areas themselves, it first attracted labourers from the
countryside, and later guest-workers.  In a third phase, it  relocated production to the
periphery. The fact is that wage labourers get organized and press for higher wages,
especially when conditions make it no longer possible to supplement wage income by, for
example,  subsistence  farming.  However,  higher  wages  create  purchasing  power,
increasing sales potentials. Capital therefore can meet the wage claims to a degree that
maximally corresponds to the increase in productivity. As a result, high-tech production
and highly skilled and highly remunerated labour tend to concentrate in certain areas.
The presence of cheap labour in other areas creates the possibility of low-cost production
for the markets of the first areas, and capital can make a choice between relocation and
innovation. In this way, capital accumulation leads to a division between peripheral areas
or  heteronomous  cheap  labour  regions,  and  core  areas  or  loci  of  autonomous
technological development. At the same time, the need for cheap labour sets structural
limits to proletarization. 
13 The segregation of high-tech and low-tech production reproduces the former division of
labour in which peripheral areas played the role of suppliers of raw materials and of
certain  foodstuffs  (as  many  peripheral  areas  still  do).  This  division  of labour
characterized  the  world-economy  in  the  long  sixteenth  century  (the  period  of  its
emergence), in the subsequent age of mercantilism (the period of its consolidation) and
from the mid-eighteenth until the last quarter of the twentieth century. In the first two
periods,  it  was  limited  to  Europe  (minus  Norway,  Russia  and  the  Balkans)  and  the
European colonies in America (minus Louisiana). At the end of the first period, core areas
were Holland, Zeeland, south-east England and north-west France. Europe to the east of
the Elbe, Northern Europe, Sicily, Sardinia, the southern parts of the Italian and Iberian
peninsulas,  Ireland,  Scotland,  Wales  and  the  colonies  in  America  constituted  the
periphery.  European Russia,  the Indian subcontinent,  the Ottoman Empire and Upper
Guinea were incorporated between 1750 and 1850/1880, and the rest of the world in the
next half century. The incorporation involves, among other things, the creation of larger
units of decision making either at the site of direct production or at the site of mercantile
collection  of  production,  the  curbing  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  destruction  of  the
manufacturing industry, and also changes in the state machinery or political institutions
(Wallerstein,  1974,  1980,  1989).  It  should  be  noted that  “not  all  the  areas  physically
located inside the boundaries of the world-economy had necessarily been from the outset
involved in the social economy”. The areas inside the perimeter of the world-economy,
yet not belonging to it, are subject to similar processes of incorporation (Hopkins and
Wallerstein, 1977, p. 125). 
14 A system of division of labour between core areas and peripheral areas in the above sense
could not endure without an asymmetrical inter-state system of strong states preventing
weak states from breaking that system. The emergence of  the world-economy in the
sixteenth century brought the then political entities into increasingly sustained relations
with one another:
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15 The progressive formation of these polities as stronger and weaker states in relation to
one another in the emerging European (later, international) state system went hand in
hand with the cyclical evolving division of labour between the increasingly “core” areas
of the world-system and the increasingly “peripheral” areas.  And the world-economy
became basically structured as an increasingly interrelated system of strong “core” and
weak “peripheral” states, in which inter-state relations – and hence patterns of state-
formation and, in that setting, the formation of nationally-organized “societies” – are
continually shaped and in turn continually shape the deepening and expanding world-
scale division and integration of production (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977, pp. 112-113). 
16 The  coherence  of  the  system  depends  on  a  powerful  doctrine,  the  doctrine  of
universalism, according to which every country has the opportunity to become a modern,
highly developed state, if it accepts Western economic and political systems. However,
the  geographical  structure  of  the  system itself  makes  the  fulfilment  of  universalism
impossible. By “geographical structure” we mean (i) the economic-geographical division
of core areas (the loci  of autonomous technological development,  where skilled wage
labour  possessing  considerable  purchasing  power  is  concentrated),  peripheral  or
heteronomous areas (where unskilled cheap labour is concentrated) and semiperipheral
areas (which consist  of  declining former core areas and ascending former peripheral
areas);  and  (ii)  the  political-geographical  division  in  strong  and  weak  states  that
corresponds with the economic-geographical division.
 
Extreme right-wing nationalism in Europe: the case of
the Vlaams blok
17 The Vlaams blok (VB) came into existence as an alliance of two small parties that recruited
members from the radical wing of the Volksunie (People’s Union, a democratic sub-state
nationalist party) and united a year later in 1979. It started to show success only after its
transformation  from  an  authoritarian  radical  nationalist  party  to  an  authoritarian
populist anti-migrant party (Table 1). Its motto “eigen volk eerst” (“[one’s] own people
first”)  is  shorthand  for  insistence  on  a  direct  relationship  between  people  and
government, putting the will of the people-identified with morality and justice-above all
other social standards and mechanisms, and for ethnic hostility, resulting from a belief in
the virtue of one’s own people and from the idea of a manipulation of this people by
dominant  or  allegedly  privileged  groups2.  It  takes  a  virulent  anti-socialist  and  anti-
unionist stand in socio-economic matters and displays a visceral hatred of Agalev (Live
Differently, the green party of Flanders). 
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Table 1. Belgium, House of Representatives; Flemish Region, Flemish Council (% of seats).*
* Bold type: government party; italic type: government party in 1988; underlined:
government party resigned in 1988; 
-: not yet founded
** Includes: Front Démocratique des Francophones (Democratic Front of French-Speakers), 10% in
1974, 1% in 1987
Sources: Spectrum Jaarboek, 2000; Witte et al., 1997
18 According  to  the  analysis  of  voting  behaviour  at  the  general  elections  of  1995  by
Elchardus and Pelleriaux (1998),  VB appears to attract unskilled voters who have lost
their confidence in humankind and politics. These voters are driven by self-interest, and
are  ethnocentric  and  materialistic.  According  to  Elchardus  and  Pelleriaux,  voting
behaviour in Flanders is increasingly determined by the perception of a development
from  a  class  society  to  an  incompletely  meritocratic  society.  From  distrust  of  this
meritocracy, a large part of the unskilled population pleads for authoritarianism. The
highly-educated  population,  on  the other  hand,  has  more  faith  in  the  individual’s
capacity and therefore also in democracy. In this way, Elchardus and Pelleriaux are able
to explain not only the success of VB but also the success of Agalev. VB and Agalev both
relate  to  a  variant  of  the  socio-cultural  cleavage,  namely  distrust  of,  as  opposed  to
confidence in, the meritocratic society. The socio-cultural cleavage revolves around the
issue of living together. Elchardus and Pelleriaux call the cleavage that pits VB and Agalev
against  each  other  the  new  specification  of  this  socio-cultural  cleavage.  The  old
specifications, equally revolving around the issue of living together, were religion and
nation. They are still polarizing voting behaviour: church-going voters are significantly
over-represented  in  the  Christelijke  Volkspartij (Christian  People’s  Party,  the  Christian
Democratic party of Flanders) as are Flemish nationalist voters in the Volksunie. Likewise,
the socio-economic cleavage, revolving around the issue of equality and distribution, pits
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the  Vlaamse  Liberalen  en  Democraten  (Flemish  Liberals  and  Democrats)  and  the
Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party) against each other. 
19 Elchardus and Pelleriaux seem to have proven the lasting relevance of  the theory of
cleavages. This theory states that societal conflicts are neutralized by the existence of
political  parties  organized  around  fundamental  cleavages3.  In  Western  Europe,  these
fundamental cleavages were brought about by two revolutions: the industrial revolution
and  the  political  revolution  of  building  a  centralized  secular  national  state  on  the
principle of popular sovereignty. The industrial revolution is at the origin of two basic
conflicts:  capital  versus  labour  (cf.  the  socio-economic  cleavage  in  Elchardus  and
Pelleriaux),  and  agriculture  versus  industry,  or  rural  versus  urban.  The  political
revolution is equally at the origin of two basic conflicts: church versus secular state, and
region versus central state, or periphery versus centre (cf. the two old specifications of
the socio-cultural cleavage in Elchardus and Pelleriaux). In their turn, the basic conflicts
are at the origin of (families of) political parties. However, Elchardus and Pelleriaux state
the theory in terms of conflicting values. An explanation of the rise of political parties on
the basis of such conflicting values can be very deceiving, because it confines itself to
subjective reactions to objective processes, leaving the latter out of the picture. If we
adhere to the theory but start from conflicting interests, we arrive at another explanation
of the rise of VB and Agalev. 
20 In Western Europe, the substitution of an industrial class society for the agrarian estate
society affected the position of power of certain social  groups and organizations and
brought other social groups and organizations into comparable positions of power. These
groups and organizations were able to transform their sectional interest into a collective
interest by means of an ideology that appeared to exert an attraction on members of all
other social  strata.  As a consequence,  they constituted what may be called a natural
electorate for political parties organized to promote such collective interests. In the
course  of  time-through  objective  processes-a  party  may  lose  (a  part  of)  its  natural
electorate and voters because of (i) the development of new cleavages, calling new parties
with an overlapping natural electorate into existence, (ii) the declining importance of the
cleavage from which it derives its raison d’être, or (iii) the neglect of its raison d’être. A
party may also decline when its natural electorate simply decreases (the fate of socialist
parties  to  the  degree  that  their  natural  electorate  consists  of  manual  labourers).
Following this line of thought, we reach the conclusion that Agalev and VB are organized
around  two  different  cleavages,  instead  of  a  single  one  as  Elchardus  and  Pelleriaux
contend. 
21 Agalev derives its right to exist from a new cleavage, namely the political polarization
around  the  issue  of  the  economic  power  of  decision  brought  about  by  the  conflict
between environment  and economic  growth.  The realization of  ecologist  standpoints
implies indeed an unprecedented curtailment-by the community-of the exercise of the
right of ownership by private enterprises. VB represents an extreme right-wing populist
nationalism that gains increasing acceptance with (until now) leftist milieux like trade
unions.  We suggest  three factors that may account for its  attraction and that are of
paradigmatic  value  for  the  explanation  of  the  recent  rise  of  extreme  right-wing
nationalism in Europe:
22 (i) As a form of ethnic-linguistic nationalism, it fills the emotional vacuum created by the
continual substitution of former morals and customs by new ones (the defining feature of
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modernity), which is intensified in times of insecurity due to unemployment, flexibility
carried to extremes, and ageing4.
23 (ii) As a form of extreme right-wing populism, it pretends to offer an alternative to the
increasing centrism of the democratic parties, which seem to neglect their raison d’être,
thereby  contributing  to  a  crisis  of  legitimacy.  Mass  media,  strikers  and  marchers
increasingly denounce the excrescences and shortcomings of what we are inclined to call
Belgian  particracy5 (malfunctioning  of  government  institutions,  outstanding  weighty
judicial dossiers, malversation, dubious funding of political parties, institutional fatness,
powerlessness  against  shutdowns).  Centrism means  that  a  party  aims  at  becoming a
people’s party, i.e. a party that tries to promote the sectional interests of all social strata
(as the Christelijke Volkspartij did from the beginning)6. It also means that leftist parties no
longer put forward the demands of  economic democracy and social  reform. As such,
centrism boils down to the capitulation, before the processes of internationalization of
production and investment, of a political class that has fallen under the spell of the
ideology of neoliberalism. In the same vein, Meynen (1997) argues that the rise of the
extreme right (a) was prepared by the ideological restoration in the 1980s (the break-
through of neoliberalism) and (b) was made possible by what he calls postreformism and
the adaptation of the labour movement to this postreformism. 
24 (iii) As a form of anti-migrant populism, it complies with the demands of those who want
to discriminate against people of foreign origin because the latter profit from the welfare
state, which is based on a social pact concluded by the nationally organized employers
and  the  nationally  organized  labour  movement  without  any  intervention  from,  or
contribution by, foreigners (Deslé, 1992). 
25 In  this  way,  VB is  able  to  attract  people  who  are  emotionally  vulnerable,  opt  for
authoritarian  policies,  and  feel  deprived.  It  reflects  a  new  cleavage,  national  (or
European)  community  versus  global  (or  cosmopolitan)  community,  involving  a
polarization around the issue of an inclusive versus exclusive society. Unskilled workers,
who experience exclusion and direct competition with the low-wage countries as well as
with the so-called migrant workers, have an interest in the conservative authoritarian
answer to this cleavage (closing the borders instead of welcoming migrants).
 
Hindu nationalism and Islamism
Politics of identity in the decolonized world
26 Cleavages in decolonized states are related to the struggle of liberation. In this respect,
Ireland is a decolonized state: Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny) and Fine Gael (Family of the
Irish) still hold 131 of the 166 seats in the House of Representatives (Spectrum Jaarboek,
2000).  They  came into  existence  as  political  factions  of  the  liberation  movement  by
splitting  off  from  Sinn  Féin  (Ourselves  Alone),  the  radical  wing  of  the  movement
(nowadays  marginalized).  However,  whereas  in  Ireland  the  party  system  has  hardly
changed since independence, in most of the decolonized states the party system (often
after an intervening period of one-party system) has become more complicated. 
27 “The claim to one’s own mode of existence as a superior value and a political right”7
seems to account for one of the new cleavages that may explain the rise of new parties in
the decolonized world. The cleavage that polarizes political parties around issues like
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religion or ethnicity may be interpreted in terms of values,  whereby movements like
Islamism  and  Hinduism  are  taken  to  be  primordial  forces.  Such  an  interpretation
amounts to a culturalist interpretation of geopolitics, of which a trend-setting example
has  been  Huntington,  1993a,  1993b,  1996.  Actually  there  are  two  culturalist
interpretations,  a  strong  one  and  a  weak  one,  Huntington  being  an  example  of  the
former, and Sahlins (1994) of the latter. The strong culturalist interpretation refers to the
internal dynamics of a cultural order: the rise and success of a cultural movement is the
progressive realization of an ideal, as if, on the breeding ground of a particular national
character, a small germ, initially overrun by a Westernized state structure, has grown
into a fully developed tree. The weak culturalist interpretation refers to the interaction
between a cultural order and exogenous factors: a cultural order strengthens itself by
making certain elements of Western culture instrumental to its own functioning. Only
strong culturalism holds an undiluted primordialist view of culture and ethnicity. Weak
culturalism is much more sophisticated8. An interpretation in terms of interests, on the
other  hand,  refers  to  the  dependence  of  a  cultural  movement  on  politico-economic
developments.  In  the  next  sections,  we  present  evidence  in  favour  of  this  second
interpretation.  In  one  and  the  same  breath  we  cast  doubt  on  the  view  that  these
movements are retrograde phenomena,  including the variant of  historical  materialist
origin of which Amin, 2000, is an authoritative exponent: “In Latin America, sub-Saharan
Africa and the Arab world,  the developmental  nationalism of the Bandung years is  a
matter of the past. The retreat has not provided a way of moving beyond these policies.
On the contrary, it has resulted in serious regression. I have suggested that we should
interpret the ethnic assault on the nation (here as in Eastern Europe and the former
USSR), and the illusions of religious fundamentalism (principally Islamic, but also Hindu)
as manifestations of this regression. […] these involutions raise the possibility of a kind of
neo-fascism of weak countries” (Amin, 2000, p. 101). 
 
Hindu nationalism: the case of the Bharatiya Janata Party
28 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980, is part of a larger family of organizations
working towards the promotion of Hindu nationalism. This family of organizations is
known as the Sangh Parivar. The ideological and organizational backbone of the structure
is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, the National Volunteers Organization).  Apart
from  the  BJP  as  a  political  party,  the  movement  includes  a  whole  array  of  other
organizations such as student organizations, a religious foundation and a labour union.
Under the aegis of RSS, the Hindu nationalists built temples, provided health care and
education,  and  conducted  many  political  activities  in  order  to  make  the  population
receptive to its ideal:  a multi-faceted unity amongst all Hindus (Andersen and Damle,
1987;  Jaffrelot,  1996).  The  political  success  of  Hindu  nationalism  is  reflected  in  its
electoral  strength:  the  BJP is  currently  the  largest  party  of  India  and is  part  of  the
governing Democratic Alliance (Table 2). It is the successor of the Jana Sangh, which was
founded by a dissident member of the Congress Party and RSS activists in 1950. In 1980
the bulk of the Jana Sangh formed the BJP as a reaction to the efforts by the leadership of
Janata, a multiparty coalition that had acceded to power after 30 years of uninterrupted
Congress government, to ban party officeholders from participation in the activities of
the RSS9. 
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Table 2. India, House of the People (number of seats).*
* Bold type: government party; underlined: government party, resigned after 13 days;
- : not yet founded
** Telegu Desam (Telegu Nation): 28 seats; Janata (People’s Front): 10 seats
*** 32 seats in 1996 and 1998, included in the number of seats of the United Front
Sources: Banks and Muller, 1998; Spectrum Jaarboek, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2000
29 During the past decade, the electoral success of the BJP spread throughout virtually the
entire country. Yet Hindu nationalism as an ideology originated in Northern India, i.e. in
the Hindi-speaking states (where indeed the BJP still finds its greatest support).
30 The RSS was founded in Nagpur in 1925, where it initially attracted members of the upper
castes in the cities. As the movement grew, it became increasingly popular with the lower
castes too. The RSS disregarded the “traditional” caste system, as consolidated by the
British in their colonial administration. It promoted its activities among the entire Hindu
community without taking into account to which caste any individual Hindu belonged.
Participating in RSS activities thus allowed members of the lower castes to improve their
social status. Membership in the RSS liberated them from the social immobility induced
by the caste system. The Hindu Rashtra, the united Hindu Nation, was to take precedence
over  traditional  forms  of  social  organization.  After  India’s  independence,  the  RSS
attracted its membership from social strata that belong to the varnas of the Brahmans
and  the  Vaisyas,  such  as  bureaucrats,  professionals,  small  traders,  merchants  and
shopkeepers, who are opposed to the policy of the governing Congress Party. They feel
that  the  party,  which  had  been  at  the  forefront  of  the  independence  struggle  and
identified itself with the effort of building the modern Indian state, was no longer able to
preserve the political and social unity of that state (Bose, 1997). Neither did the Congress
Party succeed in its  stated aims of  economic development and social  equality.  Indira
Gandhi’s  communalist  rhetoric,  which  tended  to  turn  each  conflict  into  a  conflict
between  ethnic  or  religious  communities,  contributed  to  the  legitimation  of  Hindu
nationalist politics (Bose, 1997, pp. 123-124; Jaffrelot, 1996, p. 336). The problems were
exacerbated and accentuated by the embroilments  around the government’s  positive
action policies, which allocated seats in the legislative bodies, jobs in the civil service and
access to higher education to members of disadvantaged population groups (Bose, 1997,
p. 142). This contributed directly to the electoral breakthrough of the BJP in 1989 and its
consolidation in 1991, as the embroilments led members of the upper castes to vote for
the BJP. In principle, reservations policies are nothing more than the implementation of
certain articles of the constitution that make it possible to allocate civil service jobs, seats
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in the legislative bodies and access to higher education to members of the Scheduled
Castes (in principle coinciding with the untouchables),  the Scheduled Tribes and any
backward class of citizens (later designated as Other Backward Classes, in principle to be
defined according to economic criteria). However, when the younger generations of the
OBC started to agitate for an extension of the positive actions, and in 1980 the Mandal
Commission recommended the extension of positive actions in favour of the OBC to the
level of the national state, the upper castes felt that the social status quo was threatened,
although afterwards the Congress government appeared to neglect the recommendations
of the Mandal Commission (Bose 1997).  Ten years later,  the BJP accused the National
Front  government  of  accentuating  the  caste  conflicts,  when  the  latter  included  the
conclusions of the Mandal Commission in the political agenda. The BJP leader began a
religious pilgrimage to Ayodha to enhance the unity of all Hindus. He was detained and
the BJP terminated its support to the government. The BJP became even more successful
in the late 1990s by at first canalizing Hindu discontent with the government’s market
orientated social and economic policy and later moderating its Hindu nationalist image to
forge ties with state and regional parties (Banks and Muller, 1998, p. 415). 
31 The BJP’s goals are similar to those of the Congress Party. It wants to transform India into
a modern, industrial, military power with a united nation and a disciplined work force
(Brass, 1995, p. 88). Yet, in contrast to the Congress Party, it makes frequent use of Hindu
beliefs and symbols as a focus for creating a true national identity. One of the important
aspects  of  the political  discourse of  the BJP is  the notion of  integral  humanism,  the
justification of which is found in the Vedas. Integral humanism rejects Western political
philosophy  (capitalism and socialism alike)  because of  its  materialism.  It  propagates
social harmony and popular participation in political and economic matters (Andersen
and Damle,  1987,  pp.  172-174).  Other points  of  reference are positive secularism and
Gandhian socialism (Jaffrelot, 1996, p. 316). Through positive secularism, the BJP attacks
the  “pseudo-secularism”  of  the  Congress  Party.  The  Congress  Party  is  accused  of
favouring the Muslim minority over the Hindu majority by allowing them in certain
special cases to live according to their own religious laws (as opposed to Indian national
law) (Bose, 1997, pp. 128-129; Van der Veer, 1994, p 103). Through the propagation of
concepts  like  Gandhian  socialism,  the  BJP  makes  ample  use  of  Mahatma  Gandhi’s
symbolic capital and tries to associate the party with his heritage.
32 The BJP can be qualified as an Indian variant of a people’s party, weaving between plain
RSS populism and moderated Hindu nationalism, and trying to attenuate its upper caste
image by admitting members of the OBC to the party apparatus. The implication is that
the BJP is not a fundamentalist religious party10, if we want to use this epithet correctly.
Fundamentalism as an organized movement dates from the early twentieth century. It
consisted of ultraconservative Protestants who vigorously opposed the new historical and
literary  approach  of  the  Bible.  They  only  permitted  a  literal  interpretation  of  the
Scriptures, the Word of God, the sole standard in religious matters as well as in political
and social issues.  By extension, fundamentalism means the idea that every revival or
criticism should be based on an absolute return to what is written in the holy texts, and
the one and only reason for this return is the (lost) purity and virtuousness of the past.
This does not apply to the BJP. Neither does it apply to Islamism, as the next section will
show.
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Islamism
33 Public life in much of the Muslim world in recent decades has been marked by an increase
in the importance and visibility of Islamic symbols, practice and discourse. This is notably
the case in the Middle East and North Africa. The phenomenon is widespread; yet the
internal diversity in appearance and purpose is striking. The re-Islamization of public life
cannot be considered as a mere upsurge of religious fervour among the Islamic peoples,
neither is it the emergence of a universal/essential Islamic identity. The phenomenon
coincides with a decrease in the legitimacy and credibility of movements and parties
inspired  by  “old”  ideologies  such  as  communism (or  socialism for  that  matter)  and
secular nationalism. Governments born out of the nationalist struggle of the 1950s and
’60s  are  challenged  by  different  groups,  in  most  cases  groups  using  an  identitarian,
Islamic discourse. This movement is broadly called Islamism.
34 The resurgence of Islam has become apparent through a variety of political and societal
expressions. Media coverage by Western news agencies (especially since the end of the
Cold War) tends to focus on “Islamic” terrorist activities such as kidnappings, bombings
or  other  forms  of  violent  political  action.  Political  action,  however,  also  and  more
importantly takes place at other levels of public life. Since the 1970s a large Islamic third
sector  has  emerged:  Islamic  voluntary  organizations take  up social  activities  for  the
benefit  of  (mainly)  urban  populations  (Tozy,  1996,  p.  61;  Ayubi,  1996,  p.  196).  They
distribute food and clothes, and organize health care, community care and events such as
marriages,  which  are  beyond  the  financial  reach  of  the  average  family  if  they  are
organized  privately.  The  Islamists  also  participate  in  parliamentary  politics,  when
allowed. In Jordan, members of the Muslim Brotherhood have even risen to the rank of
Minister of Education and of Religious Affairs. In Algeria, the Islamists won an important
majority in the local elections of 1990. Yet all parties referring to religion or ethnicity as
their main issue of concern were subsequently banned. This government decision marked
the start of years of unrestrained violence in the country. Where banned from formal
political  participation,  the  Islamist  groups  either  keep  operating  illegally,  stand  as
independent  candidates,  or  search  for  alternatives  such  as  unofficial  alliances  with
secular government-approved parties or more indirect forms of political participation
(Rousillon, 1990, p. 28). In Egypt, Islamists have become an important political factor in
the  professional  organizations  of  lawyers,  medical  doctors  and  engineers  (Rosefsky-
Wickham, 1997, p. 126). 
35 These  highly  skilled  professionals  form  the  ideological  backbone  of  the  Islamist
movement. It is not the traditional Islamic leaders, the ulama, who are in control, but
laymen with a modern education (Khosrokhavar, 1994, p. 129). The Islamists are also very
popular with future professionals, attracting huge followings among students at schools
and  universities.  Many  of  the  elected  student  bodies  (notably  in  Palestine)  have  an
important Islamist  representation.  In terms of  classification according to social  class,
most of the militants are from a lower-middle-class background. However, upper classes
also are attracted to the Islamist message; moreover, it is they who provide the greatest
financial leverage within the movement, through their positions in business and banking.
The rank-and-file of the movement is made up of people with a lower-class background,
who are increasingly experiencing difficulty in meeting their basic needs (Pfeifer, 1997, p.
162).
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36 The  self-proclaimed  political  purpose  of  Islamism is  the  Islamization  of  society  and
ultimately the state. Yet Islamization is an elusive concept: the different movements and
individual militants do not agree about its content. Most avoid internal controversy by
merely stating that they want the shari’a, the Muslim law, reintroduced. This does not,
however, give any clues as to the content of Islamic law: Islamists agree that the divine
revelations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah are the sources for legislation, but are still
subject to (judicial) interpretation. The position of Islamist ideology on a scale from left to
right is not precisely determinable (Pfeifer, 1997, p. 157). Movements and militants can be
conservative or progressive,  as  far  as  these categories apply.  This  is  clearly the case
looking at, for example, socio-economic issues such as distribution of wealth or more
philosophical issues such as the position and status of women in society. Some Islamist
movements are convinced that the existence of inequality is the will of God, while others
claim that inequality is an injustice created by unjust rulers, which cannot be tolerated by
pious Muslims. Some Islamist movements think that women should be totally submissive
to their husbands; others insist that Islam bestows certain unalienable rights on women
(Burgat, 1996, p. 246).
37 What all  Islamist movements have in common, however,  is their oppositional nature.
They turn against the secular post-independence regimes and identify this secularism as
the root cause of their failure to build a prosperous and just society.  Secularism was
something  the  new  political  regimes  inherited  from  the  West.  Immediately  after
independence,  the  political,  secularized  elites  embarked  on  a  “modernization  and
development”  effort  according  to  the  rules  taught  to  them by  their  former  colonial
masters.  A  heavily  centralized modern state  was  built  in  order to  achieve  economic
development. Governing that state was to be the sole prerogative of the secular elites. In
exchange for political  peace,  the populations were provided with different aspects of
welfare such as free medical care, free education and a guaranteed job (Vieille, 1995, p.
315).  This  social  contract  came  under  pressure  as  the  state’s  financial  and  political
resources  failed  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  growing  and  increasingly  educated
population. Aspiring graduates found that they could be out of work for years; poorer
strata of the population were deprived of essential means to sustain themselves. As soon
as  the  costs  and  benefits  of  modernization  proved  to  be  unequally  distributed,
movements that challenged the western ideological domination started to emerge.
38 According to the Islamists, Western modernity has proved not to be the way in which
Muslims can be successful. They accuse their governments of merely imitating the West.
The West, and by proxy the post-independence regimes and the political elites of which
they consist, are dismissed as morally reprehensible. Islamists accuse the political elites
of being infidels and therefore illegitimate rulers in a Muslim society. They reject the
notions  of  liberation  and  emancipation  professed  by  the  nationalists,  because  these
proved  deceptive:  liberation  from  colonial  domination  apparently  had  only  meant
liberation of the secular elites and not of the entire population (Burgat, 1997, p. 77). For
members of the poorer strata of the population, Islamism is a vehicle of protest, a way to
challenge the status quo and to attack the political elites that did not live up to their pre-
independence  promises  of  liberty  and  prosperity.  However,  members  of  some  more
prosperous  strata  also  have  an interest  in  the  Islamist  ideology,  because  it  seeks  to
diminish the political power of the secular bureaucrat elite and to loosen state control
over all aspects (especially economic) of life.
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39 Although Islamism, as opposed to nationalism and socialism, uses religious contexts and
discourses  to  bring its  points  home,  this  does  not  mean that  secular  aspirations are
replaced with religious ones. Islamism is a project for a society aimed at fulfilling the
worldly  aspirations  of  its  politically  and  economically  deprived  adherents.  This  is
translated into a form of cultural protest, at least partly because the economic/political
and cultural  gaps overlap:  the Westernized political  elite  is  pitted against  an Islamic
counterforce consisting of an aspiring educated elite and the deprived masses who feel
betrayed by a nationalist ideology that has not lived up to its promises. Higher classes
jump  on  the  bandwagon  because  they  see  the  advantages  of  a  “smaller”  state  and
economically more liberal policies. 
 
Politics of identity and the geographical structure of
capitalism
40 Hindu  nationalism  and  Islamism  oppose  the  development  policies  of  the  governing
powers for obvious reasons: the policies are a failure.  In most cases,  these governing
powers, who take universalism for granted, represent secular nationalism. Amin (2000)
even speaks of development nationalism. The list of factors that account for the failure of
development  policies  includes  undoubtedly  the  weaknesses  of  individual  state
machineries,  individual  regimes  and  individual  politicians.  However,  whatever  the
shortcomings  of  the  governing  powers  may  be,  governments  that  rule  weak
(semi)peripheral states have to come up against the hard facts of the world-economy.
Prosperity is reserved for only a minority of regions. As a rule, (semi)peripheral states
have  insufficient  means  to  realize  a  distribution  of  welfare  among  the  population
comparable to that in core states. Welfare can be created only for elites with their clients
who nestle in and around the state apparatuses. Once they are in power, they will stick to
it at all costs, the more so when it concerns the elite that has gained the independence.
Democracy will suffer. Opposition will be misperceived as subversion, and in this way,
governing powers will  make themselves incapable of  preserving the unity of  society.
Outbreaks  of  violence  and  rebellion  are  proof  of  the  depth  of  the  ensuing  crisis  of
legitimacy.
41 We reach the conclusion - and corroborate thereby the view of Wallerstein (1995) on the
political development in the South11 - that Islamism and Hindu nationalism are able to
recruit  members of  what may be called the equivalent  of  the European middle class
because it was not possible for the nationalists of the first and second generation to build
a modern, thriving state on the periphery of the capitalist system. They are also able to
recruit members of the lower social strata because of their assiduous welfare work over
many years at the grassroots level, providing essential services where the state has failed
to meet its responsibilities. 
42 In a similar way, the rise of extreme right-wing nationalism/populism in Western Europe
should be linked to the role that core areas play in global capitalism. Extreme right-wing
nationalism is able to recruit unskilled workers because there are not enough jobs for
these workers. However, as an authoritarian movement, it is also able to recruit members
of other social strata because of the centrism of the democratic parties. Overwhelmed by
the need to secure the competitiveness of the national economy, these democratic parties
seem to forget why they came into existence, thereby creating a crisis of legitimacy. 
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43 In each case the working of the global economy appears to be at the origin of the crisis of
legitimacy of  the regimes concerned,  not  in the sense that  present-day globalization
generates  new  (economical  or  socio-economical)  interests  which  would  be  to  the
advantage of the political parties and movements we dealt with, but in the sense that
present-day  globalization  reproduces  the  geographical  structure  of  capitalism  and
thereby prevents the governing powers from promoting certain existing interests in an
adequate way. In these circumstances the programmes of populist parties and people’s
parties which advocate a politics of identity appeal to many people, including the upper
social strata which in the case of India benefit, for example, from the maintenance of the
status quo in the matter of reservations, and in the Islamic world from a smaller degree of
state interference. 
44 Linking politics of identity to the geographical structure of capitalism in the sense of the
division of core and (semi)peripheral areas does not amount to a full explanation of the
geography of  this  politics.  Firstly,  the content  of  the ideology behind the politics  of
identity  may make  a  difference.  We ought  to  be  aware  of  the risk  of  falling  into  a
sociological  determinism  by  fitting  politics  of  identity  to  inescapable  sociological
constraints of the world-system. The content of the ideology does matter. As Chatterjee
says in his study on nationalist thought in the colonial world,  it  is the claims of the
ideologists about what is possible in a particular historical context and what is legitimate
or morally justified that give specific shape to their politics (Chatterjee,  1993,  p.  40).
Although we have discussed the ideologies of the three movements/parties, we have not
analysed them from this perspective.  Secondly,  it  goes without saying that the three
movements/parties  are only successful  in certain parts/states  of  the relevant states/
regions and are marginalized or even absent in other parts/states. In the third section we
mentioned that Hindu nationalism originated in the Hindi-speaking part of India and that
the  BJP  still  has  its  largest  following in  this  part.  We also  pointed to  the  divergent
position of Islamism in the Arab-speaking countries around the Mediterranean Sea, which
is bounded up with the way in which the governing powers try to oppress, confine or
incorporate  Islamism12.  With  regard  to  VLAAMS  BLOK,  certain  differences  between
Flanders and Wallonia which may explain why an extreme right-wing populist party is
successful only in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium readily come to mind: there is the
acceptance  of  more  state  interference  in  economic  matters  in Wallonia;  the  longer
tradition of immigration in Wallonia; the presence, and at certain times the dominance,
of authoritarian tendencies in the substate nationalist Flemish Movement. Whether or
not these differences count as real causes still needs to be examined. 
45 However, this article is not an exercise in electoral geography, and the analysis of this
kind of spatial variation is outside our scope. Suffice it to say that such an analysis would
require a more comprehensive definition of the geographical functioning of capitalism. 
 
Conclusion
46 Undoubtedly, the rise of both Islamism and Hindu nationalism epitomize the claim to
one’s own mode of existence as a superior value and a political right. However, that does
not imply that it should be explained as a cultural struggle against Westernization rather
than  as  a  cultural  protest  against  the  political-economic  wrongs  inherent  in
(semi)peripheral capitalism. Likewise, the rise of extreme-right nationalism in Western
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Europe should be interpreted not as a self-referential cultural phenomenon, but analysed
in the light of the role that core states play in global capitalism.
47 The three cases of politics of identity are related to a crisis of legitimacy. Yet this is not to
say that Islamism and Hindu nationalism are the non-Western equivalents of extreme
right-wing nationalism in Europe. The rise of extreme right-wing nationalism in Europe is
connected with the failure of democratic parties to find an answer to a set of problems, of
which a lack of employment and social security for the unskilled population is the most
important. This phenomenon is integral to the role that core areas play in the world-
system as it functions today. The cleavage involved, national (or European) community
versus  global  (or  cosmopolitan)  community,  raises  the  issue  of  an  inclusive  versus
exclusive  society.  Extreme  right-wing  nationalism  in  Europe  is  on  the  side  of
authoritarian exclusive society. The claim to one’s own mode of existence as a superior
value and a political right in the decolonized world entails the rejection of modernity in
its Western form (and in some cases even of modernity in general). This may lead to an
exclusive society, but not necessarily to an authoritarian one. The rise of Islamism and
Hindu nationalism is connected with the inability of the generation of nationalists that
have won independence, and their immediate successors, to build a modern state. This
phenomenon is integral to the role that (semi)peripheral areas play in the world-system.
The transformation of a modern Western democratic state into an authoritarian closed
society is quite a different matter from the construction of a (possibly democratic) non-
Western modern state on the basis of principles derived from religious texts or beliefs. To
call the latter fundamentalism is a category mistake that is reminiscent of Orientalism13.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AMIN S. (2000), Capitalism in the age of globalization, London, Zed Books, third impression.
ANDERSEN, DAMLE (1987), The brotherhood in saffron: the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu
revivalism, Westview Press.
ASHCROFT B., AHLUWALIA P. (1999), Edward Saïd, the paradox of identity, London, Routledge.
AYUBI N. (1996), Political Islam, London, Routledge.
BANKS A.S., MULLER T.C. (eds.) (1998), Political Handbook of the World: 1998, Binghamton, CSA
Publications.
BOSE S. (1997), “Hindu nationalism and the crisis of the Indian State: a theoretical perspective”, 
in BOSE S., JALAL A. (eds.), Nationalism, democracy and development: state and politics in India, Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
BRASS P. (1995), The politics of India since independence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
second edition.
BULLOCK A., STALLYBRASS O. (eds.) (1981), The Fontana dictionary of modern thought, London,
Fontana/Collins, 7th impression.
BURGAT F. (1996), L’islamisme en face, Paris, La Découverte.
The geographical structure of capitalism at the origin of cultural protest ag...
Belgeo, 4 | 2001
16
CABLE V. (1999), Globalization and global governance, London/New York, The Royal Institute of
International Affairs.
CHATTERJEE P. (1993), Nationalist thought and the colonial world: a derivative discourse, London, Zed
Books, second impression.
DESLÉ E. (1992), “De betekenis van (internationale) arbeidsmigraties en van het racisme voor de
ontwikkeling van de (nationale) welvaartsstaat”, in DESLÉ E., MARTENS A. (eds.), Gezichten van
hedendaags racisme, Brussel, VUBPress, pp. 219-262.
DEWACHTER W. (1992), Besluitvorming in politiek België, Leuven/Amersfoort, Acco.
DOOM R., GORUS J. (eds.) (2000), Politics of identity and economics of conflict in the Great Lakes Region,
Brussel, VUBPRess.
ELCHARDUS M., PELLERIAUX K. (1998), “De polis verdeeld - hoe de kiezers links en rechts
herdefiniëren”, in SWYNGEDOUW M., BILLIET J., CARTON A., BAERTEN R. (red.), De (on)redelijke
kiezer, Leuven/Amersfoort, Acco, pp. 183-210.
HOBSBAWM E.J. (1994), Nations and nationalism since 1780, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
reprinted second Canto edition.
HOPKINS T., WALLERSTEIN I. (1977), “Patterns of development of the modern world-system”, 
Review, 1, pp. 111-145.
HUNTINGTON S. (1993a), “The clash of civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, 75, pp. 22-49.
HUNTINGTON S. (1993b), “If not civilizations, what?”, Foreign Affairs, 75, pp. 186-194.
HUNTINGTON S. (1996), The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, New York, Simon &
Schuster.
JAFFRELOT C. (1996), The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics 1925 to the 1990s: strategies of
identity-building, implantation and mobilization (with special reference to Central India), London, Hurst.
KHOSROKHAVAR F. (1994), “Marginalisation de la jeunesse”, in GRESH A., ADELKHAH F., ARKOUN
M., BURGAT F. (eds.), Un péril islamiste, Bruxelles, Com-plexe, pp. 129-147.
LABRIE A. (1992), “La religion civile: nationalisme, nationale staat en modernisering in Europa”, 
in WESSELS L.H.M., BOSCH A., Veranderende grenzen, nationalisme in Europa, 1815-1919, Nijmegen,
SUN, pp. 59-103.
LIPSET S., ROKKAN S. (1967), Party systems and voter alignments, New York, The Free Press.
MELCHING W. (1992), “Natie, identiteit en nationalisme”, in BOSCH A., WESSELS L.H.M., 
Veranderende grenzen, nationalisme in Europa 1919-1989, Nijmegen, SUN, pp. 23-58.
MEYNEN A. (1997), “De economische en sociale politiek sinds de jaren vijftig”, in WITTE et al., pp.
285-354.
PFEIFER K. (1997), “Is there an Islamic economics?”, in BENIN J., STORK J. (eds.), Political Islam,
essays from Middle East Report, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 154-164.
RENDERS M. (1999), De schaduwkant van de maan. Islamisme in politiek, economie, maatschappij, en het
wereld-systeem, Gent, Academia Press.
REYNEBEAU, M. (1995), Het klauwen van de leeuw, Leuven, Van Halewyck.
ROSEFSKY-WICKHAM C. (1997), “Islamic mobilisation”, in BENIN J., STORK J. (eds.), Political Islam,
essays from Middle East Report, Berkeley, UCP, pp. 120-135.
The geographical structure of capitalism at the origin of cultural protest ag...
Belgeo, 4 | 2001
17
ROUSILLON A. (1990), “Entre al-jihad et al-Rayyan: phénoménologie de l’islamisme égyptien”, 
Maghreb, Machrek, 127, pp. 17-50.
SAHLINS M. (1994), “Goodbye to tristes tropes: ethnography in the context of modern world
history”, in BOROFSKY R. (ed.), Assessing cultural anthropology, New York, McGraw-Hill, pp.
377-394.
SPECTRUM JAARBOEK (1988, 1990, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2000), Uitgeverij Het Spectrum.
TAYLOR P.J. (1993), Political geography. World-economy, nation-state and locality, Harlow, Longman
Scientific & Technical, third edition.
THIJS S. (1999), Hindoe-nationalisme als antisysteembeweging?, M.A. thesis, University of Ghent. 
TOZY M. (1996), “Movements of religious renewal”, in ELLIS S. (ed.), Africa now. People, policies,
institutions, The Hague, DGIS, pp. 58-74. 
VAN DER VEER P. (1994), Religious nationalism, Hindus and Muslims in India, Berkeley, University of
California Press.
VIELLE P. (1995), “L’irrépressable imaginaire”, Peuples Méditerranéens, 70-71, pp. 309-329.
WALLERSTEIN I. (1974), The modern world-system - capitalist agriculture and the origins of the
European world-economy in the sixteenth century, New York, Academia Press.
WALLERSTEIN I. (1975), World inequality, Montreal, Black Rose Books.
WALLERSTEIN I. (1980), The modern world-system II - mercantilism and the consolidation of the
European world-economy 1600-1750, New York, Academia Press.
WALLERSTEIN I. (1983), Historical capitalism, London, Verso.
WALLERSTEIN I. (1989), The modern world-system III - the second era of great expansion of the capitalist
world-economy 1730-1840s, San Diego, Academia Press.
WALLERSTEIN I. (1991), Geopolitics and geoculture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
WALLERSTEIN I. (1995), After liberalism, New York, The New Press.
WITTE E., CRAEYBECKX J., MEYNEN A. (1997), Politieke geschiedenis van België van 1830 tot heden, 
VUBPress/Standaard Uitgeverij, 6de herziene uitgave.
ZEMNI S. (1999), “Gewelddadig islamisme in transitie: over jihad en business”, Vlaams Marxistisch
Tijdschrift, 33, pp. 70-77.
NOTES
1. On ethnic(-linguistic) nationalism, see Hobsbawm, 1994.
2. Cf. the definition of populism in Bullock and Stallybrass, 1981.
3. As we interpret it. For the original theory of cleavages, see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967. 
4. On nationalism as a means of defence against modernity or modernization, see Reynebeau,
1995, p. 33, and also Labrie, 1992 and Melching, 1992, who both refer to Hobsbawm’s notion of
“invention of tradition”.
5. Cf. Dewachter, 1992, who convincingly argues that particracy is the appropriate designation of
decision-making in political Belgium. 
6. A people’s party is the intermediate stage in the movement towards a representation party (a
party that makes direct concerted appeals to the electorate beyond narrow party channels but is
not primarily concerned with mobilizing voters to accept a special political cause; it is pragmatic
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and eschews ideology. In the age of new mass communications, political leaders can appeal to the
electorate directly, and we enter the world of personalized politics of style: see Taylor, 1993, pp.
256-257). 
7. This phrase is borrowed from Sahlins, 1994.
8. Huntington  (1996)  first  reifies  civilizations  and  then  rejects  their  mixing.  He  presents  a
number  of  examples  (Turkey,  Mexico,  Russia,  Australia)  to  show that  mixing of  civilizations
inevitably  leads  to  cultural  schizophrenia.  As  a  result  there  is  a  sharp contrast  between his
warning for,  and vision of,  a  clash of  civilizations and the following quotation from Sahlins’
defence of culturalism: “... how else can the people respond to what has been inflicted on them
except  by  devising  on  their  own  heritage,  acting  according  to  their  own  categories,  logics,
understandings? I  say ”devising“ because the response may be totally improvised, something
never seen or imagined before, not just a knee-jerk repitition of ancient custom. ”Tradition“ here
functions as a yardstick by which the people measure the acceptability of change ...  Cultural
continuity thus appears in and as the mode of cultural change. The innovations follow logically -
though not spontaneously, and in that sense not necessarily - from the people’s own principles of
existence ... Rather than the overthrow of the world system, which is now an irreversible fact of
their existence, the local peoples’ inventions and inversions of tradition can be understood as
attempts  to  create  a  differentiated  cultural  space  within  it  ...  what  needs  to  be  studied
ethnographically is the indigenization of modernity” (Sahlins, 1994, pp. 388-389, 390).
9. Banks and Muller, 1998, p. 415, who call the RSS “a paramilitary Hindu communal group”. As a
matter of fact, the action of the RSS is based on the tradition of monks who practise the martial
arts.
10. Cf. Brass, 1995, p. 88: “It is mistaken to consider the BJP a ‘fundamentalist’ religious party”.
On the other hand, the handbook of Banks and Muller (of which we have made ample use) speaks
of “the Hindu fundamentalist BJP” (p. 412).
11. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  present  study  of  Hindu  nationalism  and  Islamism  has  been
undertaken with the purpose of corroborating the view of Wallerstein.
12. Whereas mainstream Islamism is increasingly integrated in the national politics of the states
concerned, the violent groups radicalize and, with the possible exception of the Palestinian ones,
they also internationalize. As Zemni (1999) says, they inevitably make contact with the Afghan
connection, a largely internationally structured network of war veterans from the Soviet-Afghan
war. The groups and individuals who belong to this network are the product of the geopolitical
interests  of  the  United  States,  Pakistan  and Saoudi  Arabia  in  this  area.  These  new forms of
violence no longer have a clear ideological background. They dissolve in the structures of global
capitalism, in which jihad and mafia-like business practices blend into one another. 
13. Orientalism is the discourse within which, and by which, the West came to know the Orient as
something ontologically and epistemologically distinct from the Occident, a merely discursive
category that allowed the West to dominate the regions and peoples concerned. Orientalism was
defined and exposed by Said, who himself also made the comparison of Orientalism with the
recent representations of Islam (see Ashcroft and Ahluwalia, 1999).
ABSTRACTS
In a large number of  countries,  fundamental  shifts  are taking place in the balance of  power
between political  parties  or  movements.  In nearly all  cases,  the nature of  political  discourse
The geographical structure of capitalism at the origin of cultural protest ag...
Belgeo, 4 | 2001
19
underlying national politics has changed radically, the politics of identity having now become
prominent. We argue that the failure of capitalism to bring about universal prosperity is at the
origin of the rise of this type of politics. It fails to secure decent living conditions for unskilled
workers  in  the core  states of  Western Europe,  and it  fails  to  secure  opportunities  for  social
mobility  for  the  equivalent  of  the  European  middle-class  in  the  (semi)peripheral  states.  An
analysis of three cases of politics of identity that have the connotation of civilization – Islamism,
Hindu nationalism and extreme right-wing nationalism in Europe – corroborates this view. These
three cases of politics of identity appear to be related to a crisis of legitimacy. However, this does
not imply that  Islamism and Hindu nationalism are the non-Western equivalents  of  extreme
right-wing nationalism in Europe. The former are phenomena of the periphery, the latter is a
phenomenon of the core.
In  een  groot  aantal  landen  treden  er  in  het  machtsevenwicht  tussen  politieke  partijen  of
bewegingen fundamentele verschuivingen op. In vrijwel alle gevallen is de aard van het politieke
discours  achter  de  nationale  politiek  radicaal  veranderd.  De  identiteitspolitiek  trad  op  de
voorgrond. Aan de basis hiervan ligt naar onze mening het onvermogen van het kapitalisme zijn
belofte  van  universele  welvaart  waar  te  maken.  Het  kapitalisme  slaagt  er  niet  in  voor  de
laaggeschoolden in West-Europa volwaardige bestaansvoorwaarden te creëren. Het slaagt er ook
niet in de tegenhanger van de Europese middenklasse in de (semi)perifere landen voldoende
kansen op sociale mobiliteit te verschaffen. Een analyse van drie gevallen van identiteitspolitiek
met  de  connotatie  van  beschaving,  Islamisme,  Hindoe-nationalisme  en  extreem-rechts
nationalisme in Europa, bevestigt deze zienswijze. Bij alle drie is er een legitimiteitscrisis in het
spel.  Dit  betekent  evenwel  niet  dat  Islamisme  en  Hindoe-nationalisme  de  niet-Westerse
tegenhangers zijn van extreem-rechts nationalisme in Europa. Dit laatste is een verschijnsel van
de kern, de eersten zijn verschijnselen van de periferie.
INDEX
Trefwoorden identiteitspolitiek, kapitalisme, wereld-systeem, Islamisme, Hindoe-nationalisme,
extreem-rechts nationalisme in Europa
Keywords: politics of identity, capitalism, world-system, Islamism, Hindu nationalism, extreme
right-wing nationalism in Europe
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